IPSEC_RANBITS(8) Executable programs IPSEC_RANBITS(8)NAMEipsec_newhostkey - generate a new raw RSA authentication key for a host
SYNOPSIS
ipsec newhostkey [[--configdirnssdbdir] | [--password password]]
[[--quiet] | [--verbose]] [--bits bits] [--random device]
[--hostname hostname] [--output filename]
DESCRIPTION
newhostkey outputs (into filename, which can be '-' for standard
output) an RSA private key suitable for this host, in
/etc/ipsec.secrets format (see ipsec.secrets(5)) using the --quiet
option per default.
The --output option is mandatory. The specified filename is created
under umask 077 if nonexistent; if it already exists and is non-empty,
a warning message about that is sent to standard error, and the output
is appended to the file.
The --quiet option suppresses both the rsasigkey narrative and the
existing-file warning message.
When compiled with NSS support (the default), --configdir specifies the
nss configuration directory where the certificate key, and modsec
databases reside. There is no default value, though /etc/ipsec.d might
be sensible choice.
When compiled with NSS support (the default), --password specifies a
module authentication password that may be required if FIPS mode is
enabled
The --bits option specifies the number of bits in the RSA key; the
current default is a random (multiple of 16) value between 3072 and
4096. The minimum allowed is 2172.
The --random is used to specify the random device (default /dev/random
used to seed the crypto library RNG.
The --hostname option is passed through to rsasigkey to tell it what
host name to label the output with (via its --hostname option).
The output format is that of rsasigkey, with bracketing added to
complete the ipsec.secrets format. In the usual case, where
ipsec.secrets contains only the hostâs own private key, the output of
newhostkey is sufficient as a complete ipsec.secrets file.
FILES
/dev/random, /dev/urandom
SEE ALSOipsec_rsasigkey(8), ipsec.secrets(5)HISTORY
Originally written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project
<http://www.freeswan.org> by Henry Spencer. Updated by Paul Wouters
BUGS
As with rsasigkey, the run time is difficult to predict, since
depletion of the systemâs randomness pool can cause arbitrarily long
waits for random bits, and the prime-number searches can also take
unpre dictable (and potentially large) amounts of CPU time. See
ipsec_rsasigkey(8) .
A higher-level tool which could handle the clerical details of changing
to a new key would be helpful.
AUTHOR
Paul Wouters
placeholder to suppress warning
libreswan 09/06/2013 IPSEC_RANBITS(8)
