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livecd_selinux(8)	     SELinux Policy livecd	     livecd_selinux(8)

NAME
       livecd_selinux  -  Security  Enhanced  Linux Policy for the livecd pro‐
       cesses

DESCRIPTION
       Security-Enhanced Linux	secures	 the  livecd  processes	 via  flexible
       mandatory access control.

       The  livecd  processes  execute with the livecd_t SELinux type. You can
       check if you have these processes running by executing the  ps  command
       with the -Z qualifier.

       For example:

       ps -eZ | grep livecd_t

ENTRYPOINTS
       The livecd_t SELinux type can be entered via the filesystem_type, unla‐
       beled_t,	   proc_type,	 file_type,    sysctl_type,	livecd_exec_t,
       mtrr_device_t file types.

       The default entrypoint paths for the livecd_t domain are the following:

       all files on the system, /usr/bin/livecd-creator, /dev/cpu/mtrr

PROCESS TYPES
       SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the
       system

       You can see the context of a process using the -Z option to ps

       Policy governs the access confined processes have  to  files.   SELinux
       livecd  policy  is  very	 flexible allowing users to setup their livecd
       processes in as secure a method as possible.

       The following process types are defined for livecd:

       livecd_t

       Note: semanage permissive -a livecd_t can be used to make  the  process
       type  livecd_t  permissive.  SELinux does not deny access to permissive
       process types, but the AVC (SELinux denials) messages are still	gener‐
       ated.

BOOLEANS
       SELinux	policy is customizable based on least access required.	livecd
       policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to
       manipulate the policy and run livecd with the tightest access possible.

       If you want to deny user domains applications to map a memory region as
       both executable and writable, this  is  dangerous  and  the  executable
       should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the deny_execmem bool‐
       ean. Enabled by default.

       setsebool -P deny_execmem 1

       If you want to deny any process from ptracing or	 debugging  any	 other
       processes,  you	must  turn  on	the  deny_ptrace  boolean.  Enabled by
       default.

       setsebool -P deny_ptrace 1

       If you want to allow all domains to use other domains file descriptors,
       you must turn on the domain_fd_use boolean. Enabled by default.

       setsebool -P domain_fd_use 1

       If  you	want to allow all domains to have the kernel load modules, you
       must  turn  on  the  domain_kernel_load_modules	boolean.  Disabled  by
       default.

       setsebool -P domain_kernel_load_modules 1

       If you want to allow all domains to execute in fips_mode, you must turn
       on the fips_mode boolean. Enabled by default.

       setsebool -P fips_mode 1

       If you want to enable reading of urandom for all domains, you must turn
       on the global_ssp boolean. Disabled by default.

       setsebool -P global_ssp 1

       If  you	want  to control the ability to mmap a low area of the address
       space, as configured by /proc/sys/kernel/mmap_min_addr, you  must  turn
       on the mmap_low_allowed boolean. Disabled by default.

       setsebool -P mmap_low_allowed 1

       If  you	want  to  disable  kernel module loading, you must turn on the
       secure_mode_insmod boolean. Enabled by default.

       setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod 1

       If you want to boolean to determine whether the system permits  loading
       policy,	setting enforcing mode, and changing boolean values.  Set this
       to true and you have to reboot to set it back, you  must	 turn  on  the
       secure_mode_policyload boolean. Enabled by default.

       setsebool -P secure_mode_policyload 1

       If  you	want to allow unconfined executables to make their heap memory
       executable.  Doing this is a really  bad	 idea.	Probably  indicates  a
       badly  coded  executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable
       should  be  reported  in	 bugzilla,  you	 must  turn  on	  the	selin‐
       uxuser_execheap boolean. Disabled by default.

       setsebool -P selinuxuser_execheap 1

       If  you	want  to  allow	 all  unconfined  executables to use libraries
       requiring text relocation that are  not	labeled	 textrel_shlib_t,  you
       must turn on the selinuxuser_execmod boolean. Enabled by default.

       setsebool -P selinuxuser_execmod 1

       If  you	want  to allow unconfined executables to make their stack exe‐
       cutable.	 This should never, ever be necessary.	Probably  indicates  a
       badly  coded  executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable
       should be reported in bugzilla, you must turn on the  selinuxuser_exec‐
       stack boolean. Enabled by default.

       setsebool -P selinuxuser_execstack 1

       If you want to support X userspace object manager, you must turn on the
       xserver_object_manager boolean. Enabled by default.

       setsebool -P xserver_object_manager 1

       If you want to allow ZoneMinder to run su/sudo, you must	 turn  on  the
       zoneminder_run_sudo boolean. Disabled by default.

       setsebool -P zoneminder_run_sudo 1

MANAGED FILES
       The  SELinux  process  type  livecd_t can manage files labeled with the
       following file types.  The paths listed are the default paths for these
       file types.  Note the processes UID still need to have DAC permissions.

       file_type

	    all files on the system

FILE CONTEXTS
       SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file
       type.

       You can see the context of a file using the -Z option to ls

       Policy governs the access  confined  processes  have  to	 these	files.
       SELinux	livecd	policy	is very flexible allowing users to setup their
       livecd processes in as secure a method as possible.

       STANDARD FILE CONTEXT

       SELinux defines the file context types for the livecd, if you wanted to
       store  files  with  these types in a diffent paths, you need to execute
       the semanage command  to	 sepecify  alternate  labeling	and  then  use
       restorecon to put the labels on disk.

       semanage fcontext -a -t livecd_exec_t '/srv/livecd/content(/.*)?'
       restorecon -R -v /srv/mylivecd_content

       Note:  SELinux  often  uses  regular expressions to specify labels that
       match multiple files.

       The following file types are defined for livecd:

       livecd_exec_t

       - Set files with the livecd_exec_t type, if you want to	transition  an
       executable to the livecd_t domain.

       livecd_tmp_t

       -  Set  files  with  the livecd_tmp_t type, if you want to store livecd
       temporary files in the /tmp directories.

       Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon  command.
       If  you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the
       semanage fcontext command.  This will modify the SELinux labeling data‐
       base.  You will need to use restorecon to apply the labels.

COMMANDS
       semanage	 fcontext  can also be used to manipulate default file context
       mappings.

       semanage permissive can also be used to manipulate  whether  or	not  a
       process type is permissive.

       semanage	 module can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove pol‐
       icy modules.

       semanage boolean can also be used to manipulate the booleans

       system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux pol‐
       icy settings.

AUTHOR
       This manual page was auto-generated using sepolicy manpage .

SEE ALSO
       selinux(8),  livecd(8),	semanage(8),  restorecon(8),  chcon(1), sepol‐
       icy(8) , setsebool(8)

livecd				   13-11-20		     livecd_selinux(8)
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