opendnssec(7) OpenDNSSEC overview opendnssec(7)NAME
OpenDNSSEC - making DNSSEC easy for DNS administrators
SYNOPSIS
ods-control start
ods-control stop
ods-ksmutil subcommand...
ods-signer [subcommand...]
DESCRIPTION
OpenDNSSEC is a complete DNSSEC zone signing system which maintains
stability and security of signed domains. DNSSEC adds many crypto‐
graphic concerns to DNS; OpenDNSSEC automates those to allow current
DNS administrators to adopt DNSSEC.
Domain signing is done by placing OpenDNSSEC between the place where
the zone files are edited and where they are published. The current
version of OpenDNSSEC supports files and AXFR to communicate the zone
data; effectively, OpenDNSSEC acts as a "bump in the wire" between
editing and publishing a zone.
OpenDNSSEC has two daemons, which are unitedly started and stopped
through the ods-control(8) command. The two daemons in turn invoke
other programs to get their work done.
One of the daemons is the KASP Enforcer, which enforces policies that
define security and timing requirements for each individual zone.
Operators tend to interact with the KASP Enforcer a lot, through the
ods-ksmutil(1) command.
The other daemon is the Signer Engine, which in turn signs the zone
content. It retrieves that content from a file or through AXFR, and
publishes a signed version of the zone into a file or through AXFR.
Direct interaction with the Signer Engine, although not normally neces‐
sary, is possible through the ods-signer(8) command.
The keys that sign the zones are managed by an independent repository,
which is accessed over a PKCS #11 interface. The principle idea of
this interface being to unleash access to cryptographic hardware, there
are implementations in software. Also, implementations range from open
to commercial, and from very simple to highly secure. By default,
OpenDNSSEC is configured to run on top of a SoftHSM, but a few other
commands exist to test any Hardware Security Module that may sit under
the PKCS #11 API.
OPERATIONAL PRACTICES
The approach used by OpenDNSSEC follows the best current practice of
two kinds of key per zone:
KSK or Key Signing Key
This key belongs in the apex of a zone, and is referenced in the
parent zone (quite possibly a registry) in the form of DS
records alongside NS records. These parent references function
as trust delegations.
The KSK is usually a longer key, and it could harm the effi‐
ciency of secure resolvers if all individual resource records
were signed with it. This is why it is advisable to use the KSK
only to sign the ZSK.
In DNS records, the KSK can usually be recognised by having its
SEP (Secure Entry Point) flag set.
ZSK or Zone Signing Key
This key also belongs in the apex of a zone, and is actually
used to sign the resource records in a zone. It is a shorter
key for reasons of efficiency, that is rolled over on a fairly
regular basis. To detach these rollovers from the parent, the
ZSK is not directly trusted by the parent zone, but instead its
trust is established by way of a signature by the KSK on the
ZSK.
OpenDNSSEC is mindful about the period of validity of each key, and
will rollover in time to keep the domain signed, with new keys, without
any downtime for the secure domain. The only thing that is not stan‐
dardised, and thus cannot be automated at the moment is the interface
between a zone and its parent, so this has to be done manually, or
scripted around OpenDNSSEC.
SEE ALSOods-control(8), ods-enforcerd(8), ods-hsmspeed(1), ods-hsmutil(1),
ods-kaspcheck(1), ods-ksmutil(1), ods-signer(8), ods-signerd(8),
ods-timing(5), http://www.opendnssec.org/
AUTHORS
OpenDNSSEC was made by the OpenDNSSEC project, to be found on
http://www.opendnssec.org/
OpenDNSSEC February 2010 opendnssec(7)
